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AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT—California v. Ciraolo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement officials have increasingly turned to aerial sur-
veillance as a means of combating crime. 1 Aerial surveillance often 
enables police to view areas that they otherwise would be unable to 
view without a warrant. Consequently, considerable conflict has de-
veloped over whether this means of surveillance constitutes a search 
under the fourth amendment. 2 In California v. Ciraolo,3 the United 
States Supreme Court held that naked-eye aerial observations of 
the curtilage of a home, when made from navigable airspace, do not 
constitute a search protected by the fourth amendment.4 
Ciraolo is significant not only for the resulting impact on individ-
uals and law enforcement officials, but also because it underscores 
the Court's continuing trend toward narrowing the scope of the 
fourth amendment. 5 This Note analyzes the Court's opinion in 
Ciraolo and concludes that, although the Court applied the reason-
able expectation of privacy test enunciated in Katz v. United 
States,6 it overlooked the central thrust of the second prong of the 
test, and thus failed to properly balance the individual's privacy in-
terest against the utility of the governmental surveillance. As a re-
sult, Ciraolo constitutes a distorted interpretation of Katz that fails 
to adequately preserve fourth amendment protections against devel-
opments in governmental surveillance. 
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I I . T H E C U R T I L A G E AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
A. Pre-Katz Era 
For a number of years the Supreme Court reasoned there was no 
fourth amendment search unless there was a physical intrusion into 
a "constitutionally protected area." 7 The protected areas were 
deemed to be those enumerated in the fourth amendment itself: 
persons, houses, papers, and effects. 8 Under this literal pre-Katz ap-
proach, the protections afforded to one's "house" encompassed not 
only the interior of the house but also all structures and land within 
its curtilage. 9 As a result, the curtilage doctrine became an impor-
tant common law property doctrine used in evaluating fourth 
amendment challenges. 
The curtilage at common law was defined essentially as it is to-
day. In short, a common sense approach was adopted wherein the 
land and buildings within reasonable proximity to the home were 
included, while land and buildings remote from the home were not 
part of the curtilage. 1 0 Thus, under the pre-Katz physical intrusion 
approach, a search was unconstitutional if the police trespassed on 
the curtilage, but if no intrusion on the curtilage occurred, there 
was no fourth amendment violation. 1 1 
B. Katz Era 
In Katz v. United States,12 the Supreme Court removed the tres-
pass requirement as a prerequisite to a fourth amendment viola-
tion. 1 3 In Katz, the FBI attached an electronic listening device to 
the exterior of a public telephone booth in order to listen to the 
defendant's telephone conversation. Although the parties character-
ized the issue as whether a public telephone booth is a constitution-
ally protected area, the Court rejected this approach because: 
[Tjhis effort to decide whether or not a given area, viewed in the ab-stract, is constitutionally protected deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 
7 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1981). 
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928). 
9 Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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. . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessi-ble to the public, may be constitutionally protected.14 
The Court concluded that "the reach of the [fourth amendment] 
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into any given enclosure." 1 6 The Court held that the government's 
electronic eavesdropping violated the privacy upon which the de-
fendant justifiably relied. 1 6 As a result, the government's eavesdrop-
ping constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth 
amendment. 1 7 
In his noteworthy concurring opinion, Justice Harlan set forth a 
two-pronged test for determining the extent of fourth amendment 
protection. According to Harlan, the prerequisites for a reasonable 
expectation of privacy included "first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasona-
ble." 1 8 The Supreme Court subsequently adopted Harlan's two-
pronged test. 1 9 
By basing fourth amendment analysis on the protection of people, 
rather than on the protection of places, the Court aligned the scope 
of the fourth amendment with its underlying purpose of protecting 
people from unreasonable governmental intrusions. A rigid, literal 
approach had been replaced by a more flexible, policy-oriented ap-
proach. This new test suggested a fundamental expansion of the 
fourth amendment. 
The first prong of the Harlan test has not proved particularly 
troublesome for the courts. Courts have focused on the individual's 
conduct in order to determine if he exhibited an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy. 2 0 In general, courts have only required indi-
viduals to protect against observations from commonly expected 
vantage points in order to have manifested a subjective expectation 
of privacy. 2 1 In short, satisfaction of the first prong of the Harlan 
test is dependent upon the facts of each particular case. 
The second prong of the Harlan test has proved more elusive and 
troublesome. In United States v. White,22 Justice Harlan indicated 
that the second prong must "be answered by assessing the nature of 
a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the indi-
14 Id. at 351-52. 
15 Id. a t 353. 
16 Id. at 352. 
17 Id. at 359. 
18 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
1 8 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
20 See, e.g., id. at 740. 
" See State v. Pointer, 95 Idaho 707, 711-13, 578 P.2d 969, 973-74 (1974) (defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy where curtilage only surrounded by a low picket 
fence). Cf. Pate v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 721, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970) 
(where occupants had drawn curtains so as to preclude ground level observations, court 
held it a search for officers to climb onto a second-story trellis and peer into defendant's 
hotel room). 
" 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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vidual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct 
as a technique of law enforcement." 2 3 As one commentator noted, 
"the ultimate issue under Katz is a value judgment, namely, 
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the po-
lice is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the 
amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be di-
minished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open 
society." 2 4 
Katz made it apparent that the curtilage doctrine would no 
longer act as a barrier to limit the scope of the fourth amendment. 
Under the reasoning of Katz, it would be possible to have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in an area outside the curtilage. Katz 
thus signaled a decline in the importance of the curtilage doctrine, 
and many courts deemed it unwise to undertake a curtilage analysis 
after Katz.26 
C. Oliver Era 
In Oliver v. United States,26 the Court stated that "the special 
protection accorded by the fourth a m e n d m e n t . . . is not extended to 
the open fields." 2 7 The Court held that the open fields approach was 
consistent with Katz because "an individual may not legitimately 
demand privacy for activity conducted out of doors in fields, except 
in the area immediately surrounding the home." 2 8 The bright line 
rule adopted in Oliver was contrary to the thrust of Katz, which 
rejected such an approach in favor of a case-by-case analysis. Im-
plicitly recognizing this deviation from Katz, the Oliver majority 
concluded that a case-by-case approach would make it too "difficult 
for the policeman to discern the scope of his authori ty." 2 9 
Regardless of the wisdom of Oliver, it signaled a renewed signifi-
cance in the curtilage doctrine when the courts face an open fields 
issue. If the area is found to be an open field, then the fourth 
amendment does not protect activities conducted therein and the 
two-part Katz analysis is unnecessary. What remained to be de-
cided was the extent of protection the Katz test would provide for 
activities conducted within the curtilage. 
2 3 Id. at 786. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), the Court adopted 
Harlan's balancing formula. 
2 4 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L . REV. 349, 403 
(1974). 
4 6 See, e.g., United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1980); People v. Sneed, 
32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1973). 
2 6 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
2 7 Id. at 176. 
2 8 Id. at 178. 
2 9 Id. at 181. 
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III. California v. Ciraolo 
A. Facts and Case History 
Acting upon an anonymous telephone tip, the Santa Clara police went to the defendant's house to determine if marijuana was, in fact, growing in his backyard. The police were unable to observe the contents of defendant's backyard from ground level because of two fences that completely enclosed the yard. Later that day, the police flew over the defendant's home in a private plane for the ex-press purpose of observing and photographing his backyard. At an altitude of 1000 feet, the police were able to observe, without visual aids, marijuana plants growing in the backyard. On the basis of this naked-eye observation, the police obtained a search warrant and seized the marijuana plants. 3 0 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence based on the grounds that: (1) the warrantless aerial observation of the curtilage violated the fourth amendment; and (2) the evidence seized was the direct result of the unlawful search. 3 1 The trial court denied the suppression motion and the defendant pled guilty to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. 3 2 
The California Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the warrantless aerial observation of the backyard violated the fourth amendment.33 The appellate court began by distinguishing open field observations from curtilage observations. Relying on Oliver*4 the court reasoned that, although an individual cannot have an ex-pectation of privacy in an open field, he is entitled to demand pri-vacy for activities conducted in the area immediately surrounding his home. 3 6 Thus, the court noted that cases upholding aerial sur-veillance of open fields were inapposite to the present dispute.36 Fi-nally, the court distinguished routine aerial patrols from police air-craft focusing on a particular home. 3 7 The latter violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy while the former may not.30 As a result, the court concluded that the warrantless aerial observation of the defendant's backyard constituted an unreasona-
30 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810-11. The probable cause determination was based only on 
the officer's testimony about his observations. An aerial photo depicting the backyard was 
attached to the affidavit, but it did not support the warrant since it failed to reveal the 
nature of the plants. Id. at 1812 n.l . 
31 See People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085-86, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94-95 
(1984). 
3 3 California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986). 
33 Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98. 
3 4 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
36 Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1087, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 96. 
36 Id, at 1088-89, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. 
37 Id, at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98. 
38 Id. 
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ble search and reversed the conviction. 3 9 
After being denied review in the California Supreme Court, the 
State gained review in the United States Supreme Court. The 
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, reversed the California appellate court. 
B. United States Supreme Court 
Relying on Katz,40 the Supreme Court noted that a person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy if: (1) 
the individual has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the object of the search; and (2) the expectation is one that society 
is willing to recognize as reasonable. 4 1 
Despite asserting that the defendant clearly manifested a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, 4 2 the Court nevertheless raised the issue 
of whether such a finding was warranted. The Court noted that "a 
10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citi-
zen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a 2-level bus." 4 3 
Thus, the Court reasoned that whether the defendant "manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his back-
yard, or instead manifested merely a hope that no one would ob-
serve his unlawful gardening pursuits is not entirely clear in these 
circumstances." 4 4 Since, however, the lower court's finding was not 
challenged, the Court did not reach a conclusion on the issue. 4 5 
Turning to the second prong of the Katz test, the Court began by 
noting that "[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a 
protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately 
linked to the home . . . where privacy expectations are most height-
ened." 4 6 The Court, however, added that merely because the ob-
served area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police ob-
servation: "The Fourth Amendment. . . has never been extended to 
require law enforcement to shield their eyes when passing by a 
home on public thoroughfares." 4 7 Relying on United States v. 
Knotts,48 the Court concluded that just because "an individual has 
taken measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] 
preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where 
he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visi-
ble." 4 9 Applying this rationale to the facts of Ciraolo, the Court 
8 9 Id. at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98. 
4 0 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
4 1 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811. 
4 2 Id. 
4 8 Id. at 1812. 
4 4 Id. 
4 5 Id. at 1811-12. 
4 6 Id. at 1812. 
4 7 Id. 
4 8 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
4 9 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812. 
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noted that, since anyone could observe the defendant's backyard 
from navigable airspace, the defendant's expectation of privacy 
from such observations was not one society was willing to recognize 
as reasonable. 5 0 Thus, the Court reinstated the conviction.51 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court's decision in Ciraolo reflects the Court's con-
tinuing trend toward narrowing the scope of the fourth amend-
ment. 5 2 Despite utilization of the two-pronged Katz test, the Court's 
analysis is inconsistent with the spirit of Katz. The central premise 
underlying the Ciraolo decision is that an officer's observations 
from a public vantage point do not constitute a fourth amendment 
search. The Court bolsters this conclusion with language from Katz, 
stating that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection." 5 3 Neither of these general principles are objectionable in 
theory, yet a closer examination of the Court's application of these 
principles to Ciraolo reveals some deficiencies in the Court's 
analysis. 
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
The Court's suggestion that the defendant might not have pos-
sessed a subjective expectation of privacy from all views, since a 
policeman perched on a double decker bus might have been able to 
see into the defendant's backyard, is troubling. Such logic suggests 
an unusually high burden for satisfying the first prong of the Katz 
test. An individual should not be required to protect against obser-
vations from vantage points not ordinarily utilized by the public. 
Although it is not a search for a policeman to engage in observa-
tions from a public street, 5 4 a neighbor's property, 5 6 or the "normal 
means of access to and egress from the house," 5 6 courts have consis-
tently held that it is a search when police resort to unusual means 
to gain a view of another's property. 5 7 Katz should not be inter-
preted as requiring an individual to take extraordinary precautions 
50
 Id. at 1813. 
81
 Id. 
5 2 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
5 8 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
5 4 People v. Wright, 41 111. 2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968). 
8 8 Turner v. State, 499 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). 
8 8 Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973). 
87 See, e.g., Pate v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 721, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970) 
(holding it was a search for officers to climb onto a second-story trellis so they could see 
over the drawn curtains of defendant's hotel room). 
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to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy. Hopefully, the 
Court's hypothetical of a policeman perched on top of a double 
decker bus represents only an unfortunate overstatement by the 
Court. 
Perhaps the Court intended to suggest that an individual's sub-
jective expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance should be 
evaluated by his conduct vis a vis observations from the air (herein-
after referred to as the aerial approach). Although some courts 
have adopted such a view, 8 8 the better approach would be to use the 
individual's efforts to prevent observations from ground level or 
nearby structures as a measure of the individual's subjective expec-
tation of privacy (hereinafter referred to as the ground-level 
approach). 
To begin with, the overwhelming number of observations by the 
public of curtilage activities are made from the ground. There is no 
reason for a homeowner to suspect that ordinary airplane passen-
gers are viewing his backyard activities. Thus, the ground-level ap-
proach is consistent with the view that an individual should only be 
required to protect against the commonly expected types of obser-
vations in order to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy from 
all views.6 9 
Moreover, adoption of the aerial approach would eliminate the 
possibility of an individual ever being able to exhibit a subjective 
expectation of privacy from aerial observations of the outdoor activ-
ities within the curtilage. Individuals would be required to erect 
roofs over their yards in order to exhibit a subjective expectation of 
privacy from aerial observations. Such a technologically imposed 
change would seem contrary to the spirit of Katz, which sought to 
preserve the fourth amendment protections against developments in 
governmental surveillance. 
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Turning to the second prong of the Katz test, the Court relied on 
the "open view" doctrine 6 0 as the sole basis for concluding that the 
defendant's subjective expectation of privacy was not one that soci-
ety was willing to recognize as reasonable. Under the open view 
doctrine, observations of clearly visible objects made from a public 
vantage point do not constitute a fourth amendment search. 6 1 Ap-
plying this rationale to Ciraolo, the Court concluded the defen-
6 8 See, e.g., State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). 
6 9 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
4 0 The open view doctrine should be distinguished from the plain view doctrine. The 
latter allows the warrantless seizure of objects if there is: (1) a valid prior intrusion; and 
(2) inadvertent discovery of the incriminating objects. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 466 (1971). The open view doctrine, however, addresses whether there has been 
a fourth admendment search at all, and the Coolidge requirements are irrelevant. 
8 1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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dant's "expectation that his garden was protected from aerial obser-
vation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is 
prepared to honor." 6 2 
The Court's mechanical application of the open view doctrine in 
Ciraolo represents a superficial treatment of the issues and over-
looks the underlying objectives of the second prong of the Katz test. 
The Court relied solely on United States v. Knotts63 as authority for 
applying the open view doctrine. 6 4 Knotts involved ground level sur-
veillance of activities on public streets and is not convincing prece-
dent for extending the open view doctrine to aerial observations of 
the private areas adjoining the home. An individual's privacy inter-
est for activites conducted on a public street is ordinarily not com-
parable to that involved for activities conducted within the 
curtilage. 
Despite the unpersuasiveness of Knotts, there are cases holding 
that observations into the curtilage or the interior of the home do 
not constitute a search if made from a public vantage point. 6 5 The 
issue arises, however, as to whether the use of aerial surveillance 
should distinguish Ciraolo from this line of cases. Surveillance from 
public airspace allows the police to observe many activities that 
probably would not otherwise be exposed to the public, whereas sur-
veillance from the ground only allows the police to observe activities 
that probably have already been exposed to the public. In addition, 
aerial surveillance can pose new threats to a person's sense of secur-
ity 6 6 In short, the Court failed to fully address the extension of the 
open view doctrine and instead merely assumed that the doctrine 
should apply to aerial surveillance. 
Even more troublesome is the Court's reasoning that application 
of the open view doctrine necessitates the conclusion that Ciraolo's 
expectation of privacy was not one that society is willing to recog-
nize as reasonable. As Justice Harlan explained, the second prong 
of the Katz test should "be answered by assessing the nature of a 
particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individ-
ual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as 
a technique of law enforcement." 6 7 The Court, however, failed to 
balance these competing issues, thereby overlooking the central ob-
jective of the second prong of the Katz test. Instead, the Court con-
cluded that the open view doctrine, by itself, justified the conclusion 
that the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy was not one 
that society is prepared to honor. 6 8 
4 2 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. 
4 3 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
4 4 106 S. Ct. at 1812. 
46 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
46 See NORML v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In that case, a federal 
court found that the use of helicopters by police to warrantlessly observe homes and curti-
lages "at best disturb, and at worst terrorize, the hapless residents below." Id. a t 957. 
4 1 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
48 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. 
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One need only return to the Court's decision in Oliver to fully 
appreciate the deficiencies in the Ciraolo Court's reasonable expec-
tation analysis. Although the Oliver Court mentioned that open 
fields were generally open to public view, as support for its conclu-
sion that the defendant's expectation of privacy was not one that 
"society recognizes as reasonable," 6 9 it did not rely exclusively on 
this rationale. The Court also noted that "open fields do not provide 
the setting for those intimate activities that the [fourth amend-
ment] is intended to shelter from government interference or sur-
veillance" and that "[tjhere is no societal interest in protecting the 
privacy of those activities . . . that occur in open fields."70 Based on 
all of these reasons, the Oliver Court held that "the asserted expec-
tation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that society 
recognizes as reasonable." 7 1 
In contrast, Ciraolo involved observation of activities occurring 
within the curtilage of the home. This area provides the type of 
setting for personal activities that the fourth amendment is intended 
to shelter from unreasonable governmental surveillance. Even the 
Ciraolo Court noted that individuals' privacy expectations "are 
most heightened" for activities occurring within the curtilage. 7 2 
Furthermore, given the limited size of the curtilage, the law en-
forcement benefits derived from aerial surveillance of curtilage ac-
tivities would seem to be significantly less than the benefits derived 
from surveillance of open fields. 
In light of these circumstances, a strong argument can be made 
that, under the Katz balancing formula, an individual's expectation 
of privacy for curtilage activities is one that society should be pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable. In fact, in an aerial surveillance 
case decided the same day as Ciraolo, the Court appeared to agree 
when it stated that "[t]he curtilage area immediately surrounding a 
private house has long been given protection as a place where occu-
pants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to accept." 7 3 Nevertheless, the Court reached 
the opposite result in Ciraolo by relying exclusively on the mechan-
ical application of the open view doctrine. Such jurisprudence con-
stitutes an unwise departure from the Katz balancing analysis be-
cause it fails to focus on the truly significant issues at stake. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Ciraolo reflects the Court's con-
6 9 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
7 0 Id. 
7 1 Id. 
7 a Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812. 
7 8 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986). 
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tinuing trend toward narrowing the scope of the fourth amend-
ment. 7 4 Individuals will no longer be able to demand privacy from 
naked-eye aerial observations of their outdoor activities, when the 
observations are made from navigable airspace, 7 6 even though the 
observed activities occur within the curtilage of the home. As police 
departments increasingly resort to aerial observations as a means of 
law enforcement, the privacy previously enjoyed for outdoor activi-
ties within the curtilage will be greatly reduced. Such a result is at 
odds with the spirit of Katz, which sought to preserve fourth 
amendment protections against developments in governmental 
surveillance. 
Despite recognizing that privacy expectations "are most height-
ened" for activities occurring within the curtilage, the Court failed 
to analyze why law enforcement interests outweigh the individual's 
privacy interest in those activities. As a result, the Court overlooked 
the central thrust of the second prong of the Katz test. Instead, it 
relied exclusively on the mechanical application of the open view 
doctrine to the area of aerial surveillance as support for its conclu-
sion that Ciraolo's subjective expectation of privacy was not one 
that society is prepared to honor. This mechanical jurisprudence 
has reduced the scope of the fourth amendment and ignores the 
importance of the curtilage doctrine with respect to aerial observa-
tions from navigable airspace. 7 6 If the activity is outside the curti-
lage, the aerial surveillance is per se constitutional under the Oliver 
open fields doctrine, and if the outdoor activity is within the curti-
lage, the aerial surveillance is per se constitutional under the open 
view doctrine as applied in Ciraolo. 
74 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
7 5 But see People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 626, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1986) (naked-eye 
aerial observations made from other than navigable airspace held impermissible and the 
rule of Ciraolo is not applicable to such observations). 
7 6 The Courts decision in Dow Chemical Co., reaffirming the curtilage doctrine, was 
issued the same day as Ciraolo. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). Dow Chemical Co., however, is 
factually distinguishable from Ciraolo because it involved a commercial facility and the 
Court analogized the 2,000 acre industrial complex to an open field, while distinguishing it 
from homes or offices. Id. at 1823, 1825-26. Neither case creates a rule of law applicable 
to aerial observations of activities conducted within a structure. 
